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Abstract
This paper brings together and analyses the results of empirical analyses which,
in contrast to most other studies, find that trade has been a significant cause of
labour market inequality in various industrialised countries. The approach is
based upon the concept of outsourcing – whereby the low-skill parts of the
production chain are ‘ outsourced’ to low-wage countries. A distinguishing
feature of the empirical work is the use of highly detailed trade data, which allow
imports from high- and low-wage countries to be separately identified at the
industry level. Using cost minimisation framework, we show that imports from
low-wage countries have made a significant contribution to the decline in the
wage-bill share and/or relative employment of less-skilled workers in the UK, the
USA, Sweden and Italy. We also show how the country-specific characteristics
of outsourcing can lead to quite different inequality outcomes in different
countries. In line with other studies, we also find that technology has played an
important role in causing the increase in inequality in many countries. However,
there is also some evidence that some of the rapid increase in the application of
new technologies in recent decades has been trade-induced through mechanisms
such as ‘defensive innovation’.
Keywords:  Outsourcing, skilled and unskilled workers, inequality, technology,
defensive innovation.
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1. Introduction
The decline in the relative economic fortunes of unskilled workers in various
industrialised countries over the past two decades has been extensively
documented and analysed.
1 Empirical studies based upon the traditional neo-
classical trade theory, which identifies trade and technology as the potential
causes of inequality tend to conclude that the increase in imports from low-wage
countries has played, at most, a minor role in this development. However, recent
econometric research based on the notion of  outsourcing, where firms reduce
costs by moving low-skill-intensive production activities to low-wage countries,
tends to find a significant impact of trade on the relative employment and wages
of unskilled workers in industrialised countries. This paper brings together and
collates our work on outsourcing which provides considerable empirical
evidence that trade has had a significant impact on labour market inequality in the
UK, the USA, Sweden and Italy.
Traditional trade theories primarily explain movements in relative wages across
industries, whereas what needs to be explained is the actual dramatic fall in the
relative wages and employment of unskilled workers that has occurred  within
sectors. Such a development is consistent with outsourcing and in this paper we
begin by describing how the various mechanisms of outsourcing can explain
rising inequality within industries. We then discuss how the particular way that
outsourcing is measured empirically (through trade variables) may have an
important, and potentially misleading, impact on the results of many other studies
which investigate the impact of trade on inequality.
We argue that more accurate proxies for outsourcing are obtained by using
highly disaggregated bilateral trade data (preferably expressed in volume terms).
We then describe our empirical results – based on bilateral trade, industry and
labour market data disaggregated to a detailed level – which show that imports
from low-wage countries (our proxy for outsourcing) have made a significant
contribution to the decline in the wage-bill share and relative employment of the
less-skilled in various countries. Such  disaggregated data also reveal how
                                                                
1 See, for example: the Summer 1995 and Spring 1997 issues of the  Journal of Economic
Perspectives; Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Special Issue on
‘Globalisation and Labour Market Adjustment’ edited by David Greenaway and Douglas Nelson);
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 50, No. 1 and Vol. 54, No. 1.ANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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outsourcing can lead to quite different inequality outcomes in different countries.
Nevertheless, in line with other studies, our work finds that technology has also
played an important role in causing the increase in inequality in many countries,
but we also suggest that much of the rapid increase in the application of new
technologies in recent decades may have been partly trade-induced. Finally, our
conclusion briefly addresses the policy implications of our conjecture that trade
has played a substantial role in influencing the within-sector distribution of wages
and employment in the manufacturing industry of many industrial countries. We
argue that intervention to curtail trade is not an appropriate response.
2. Outsourcing
Two main explanations are frequently offered for the apparent shift in demand
away from low-skilled workers in industrial countries over the past two decades,
which, it is commonly perceived, has contributed to an increase in wage
inequality in countries with relatively flexible labour markets (the USA and the
UK) and a rise in unemployment for such workers in countries with more rigid
labour markets (continental Europe). First, that skill-biased labour-saving
technical progress has reduced the relative demand for unskilled workers.
Second, that increased international trade with nations with an abundant supply
of low-skill and low-wage labour has decreased the demand for low-skilled
workers in the advanced industrialised countries. Standard trade theory suggests
that both of these factors could be responsible for the decline in the fortunes of
low-skilled workers in industrial countries and that empirical analysis is required
to identify the relative importance of each.
Traditional trade theories primarily explain movements in relative wages across
industries, whereas industrialised countries have experienced a dramatic fall in the
relative wages and employment of unskilled workers within sectors.
2 Indeed, the
observed shift away from the use of unskilled labour within all industries is in
contradiction with trade being the principal cause of rising inequality in the
traditional model. If trade with low-wage countries has reduced the relative wage
of unskilled labour then firms within all sectors have an incentive to use relatively
more of this now cheaper factor. Consequently, there should be an increase in
the  relative use of unskilled labour in  all sectors. This has led a number of
authors to conclude by deduction that factor-biased technological change must
be the principal cause of the observed shift away from the use of unskilled
labour. However, the impact of globalisation appears to be more complicated
than is allowed for within the confines of standard factor proportions trade
                                                                
2 See Sachs and Shatz (1996) and Anderton and Brenton (1998a), which look at developments
across industries in the context of traditional trade theories such as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
model incorporating the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.OUTSOURCING AND INEQUALITY
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theory. We need to look more carefully at how firms within sectors respond to
the more intense competition provided by increased imports from low-wage
countries.
One explanation of how trade with low-wage countries may push down the
relative wages and employment of unskilled workers within industries is provided
by the notion of ‘outsourcing’. Outsourcing occurs where firms take advantage
of both the low-wage costs of relatively labour abundant countries and modern
production techniques – whereby the process of manufacturing a product can be
broken-down, or fragmented, into a number of discrete activities – and move the
low-skill-intensive parts of production abroad, but continue to carry out the high-
skill-intensive activities themselves.
3 Once the low-skill activities have been
performed, the goods are then imported back from the low-wage countries and
either used as intermediate inputs or sold as finished goods. Hence, trade with
low-wage countries via this route will shift demand away from less-skilled
towards skilled workers in advanced industrialised countries, and put downward
pressure on the relative wages and employment of low-skilled workers  within
industries.
Casual but direct evidence suggests that outsourcing plays a significant role in
modern production. For example, Nike only employs 2,500 persons in the USA
for marketing and other headquarters services, whereas about 75,000 persons are
employed in Asia producing shoes that are sold to Nike. General Electric imports
all of the microwaves marketed under their brand name from Samsung in Korea
(Magaziner and Patinkin, 1989). Outsourcing is also a well-documented feature of
industries such as footwear (Yoffie and Gomes-Casseres, 1994, and Brenton et
al, 2000), textiles
4 ( Waldinger, 1986;  Gereffi, 1993), and electronics ( Alic and
Harris, 1986). Many of the above examples – such as the General Electric case –
also illustrate that outsourcing applies to finished goods as well as intermediate
inputs.
5
                                                                
3 ‘Moving the low-skill-intensive parts of production abroad’ does not necessarily mean that the firm
is involved in outward foreign direct investment, it can also mean that the low-skill parts of
production are closed-down and replaced by imports – of either intermediate or finished goods –
from low-wage countries.
4 Textile World (1994) provides an idea of the relative level of wages in various low-wage countries
in the textiles sector in 1993. For example, medium-income countries such as South Korea and
Mexico have hourly compensation levels of around one quarter to one-third of those in the USA,
whereas low-income countries such as India, China and Bangladesh have average textile wage rates
under 5% of US levels.
5 Slaughter (1995) finds that multinational outsourcing contributed very little to the increase in wage
inequality in the USA. Moreover, differences in the definition of outsourcing partly explain why the
results of Feenstra and Hanson (1995) differ to those of Slaughter.ANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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In their case study analysis, Anderton and Schultz (1999) find that outsourcing of
production to low-wage countries is quite common in the medical equipment
industry in both Germany and the UK. Furthermore, the emergence of the new-
democracies of Eastern Europe has created additional outsourcing opportunities
for Germany because of the geographical proximity of these low-wage countries.
With regard to more sophisticated medical equipment – such as diagnostic,
monitoring and therapy equipment – it seems that the basic parts of production
(such as metal casings) are sometimes outsourced to low-wage countries, while
the more complex parts of the production process are performed domestically.
By contrast, the domestic production by some firms of lower-tech medical
equipment, such as simple surgical instruments, is frequently supplemented by
importing similar finished products from low-wage countries and reselling them
on the domestic market after carrying out simple tasks such as quality control
procedures and packaging. Some of the price differentials in this sector are
extremely large; for example, simple scalpels sold by one UK firm for 25 pounds
can be purchased from Pakistani companies for one pound! Hence the price
incentives to outsource can be substantial.
Jarvis and  O’Mahony (2000), in their case study analysis of the ceramic
tableware industry, report that many German companies outsource the manual
‘decoration’ of their tableware to the nearby Czech Republic and Poland and that
this accounts for roughly 20 per cent of total output volume. The net saving in
labour costs – that is, net of supervisory personnel, transport costs and
breakages in transit – amounts to roughly 30 per cent in comparison to German
ceramic tableware decorators. Glass and Saggi (2001) point out how workers in
the USA feel a real threat from outsourcing and how this has become an
important policy issue. For example, staff at a General Motors plant in Ohio went
on strike to protest at increased outsourcing to low-wage countries, while Boeing
employees (in Kansas, Washington and Oregon) went on strike to protest at
Boeing’s intention to outsource half of the value of the average jet aircraft (mostly
to China).
3. Outsourcing: Measurement Issues and Possible Mechanisms
Measurement issues
So, theory and case study evidence support the notion that outsourcing may
have played a substantial part in the wage and employment prospects of unskilled
workers in industrial countries. Is this substantiated by statistical evidence across
a range of industries in different countries? Our empirical work – based upon a
representation of the cost function of the firm – econometrically estimates the
wage bill and employment shares of low-skill workers at the industry level and
includes a measure of imports as a proxy variable for outsourcing. PreviousOUTSOURCING AND INEQUALITY
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studies based upon such an approach (see, for example, Feenstra and Hanson,
1996) proxy outsourcing by the share of imports in total consumption from all
countries, which implicitly captures the outsourcing of production to advanced
industrialised countries as well as to low-wage countries. However, there is no
obvious reason why firms would outsource low-skill-intensive activities, which is
a key mechanism by which outsourcing may affect the demand for the less-
skilled, to advanced industrialised countries which are relatively abundant in
skilled labour.
By contrast, an important feature of all of the applications reported in this paper
is that we  disaggregate imports according to individual supplier countries and
construct an import term for different groups of countries – distinguishing
between industrialised and low-wage countries – for each of the detailed industry
sectors included in the analysis. Thus, we explicitly identify imports solely from
low-wage countries and use this as a variable for explaining changes in the
relative wages and employment of the low-skilled, and thereby more accurately
proxy outsourcing to low-wage countries (particularly when compared to other
studies). 
6
Some empirical studies of outsourcing have also utilised estimates of the value of
imported intermediate inputs – usually derived from information on intermediate
inputs from input-output tables – which is then multiplied by the ratio of imports
to total purchases. In our studies we prefer to use the direct import measure for
two main reasons. First, import penetration captures the outsourcing of what are
measured as final products in the customs statistics, whereas the input-output
approach does not. For example, footwear and clothing products sold under
brand names in Europe which are actually produced in low-wage countries.
7
Second, the variables generated by these two alternative approaches are likely to
be very similar since input-output tables are compiled infrequently, typically every
five years, so that virtually all of the variation in the imported intermediate term
will be due to changes in import penetration.
Another potentially important measurement issue is whether the import term is
specified in nominal or real terms. Most studies testing for the impact of trade
on inequality specify the import penetration variable as the  value of imports
divided by the value of the sum of domestic sales and imports. However, the
change in such a  nominal term in response to, say, a decline in import prices
                                                                
6 Virtually all other empirical studies on the ‘trade and inequality debate’ do not distinguish between
imports from high and low-wage countries.
7 It might also be argued that, in addition to measuring the actual amount of intermediate inputs that
are imported, the import penetration term captures the incentive for firms to outsource, in terms of
pressure of competition in the market for the final product.ANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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could be positive or negative and will depend on the magnitudes of the demand
elasticities (in other words, it is not necessarily the case that increased external
competition results in increased import penetration in value terms).
8
In addition, if domestic producers respond to greater import competition by
increasing the quality of their products – a process which, through various
mechanisms, could also push down the relative wages and employment of the
less-skilled – then it is feasible that greater import competition could be
accompanied by a fall in import penetration in value terms. By contrast, import
penetration measured in volume terms does not suffer from these problems: with
normal demand curves, a fall in import prices, ceteris paribus, will lead to an
increase in import penetration. In certain of the applications discussed below, we
find that an index of import penetration in volume terms in our estimating
equations can be a superior alternative to import penetration variables expressed
in terms of values.
Outsourcing mechanisms
Ostensibly, one might think that outsourcing to low-wage countries – due to their
abundance of low-skill labour – would be more prevalent in low-skill-intensive
sectors in advanced industrialised countries, rather than high-skill-intensive
industries. This expectation seems reasonable if firms can substitute low-skilled
workers with outsourcing by simply importing the necessary  semi- or finished
products from low-wage countries. Firms can easily do this regardless of
whether they are low-skill/low-profit or high-skill/high-profit. By contrast, if
outsourcing requires foreign direct investment in low-wage countries – involving
the manufacture of specific components or products possibly requiring
supervision and technical expertise from the investing company – then this may
only be possible for high-skill/high-profit firms. In other words, only high-
skill/high-profit firms may have the ability to outsource – hence, under these
circumstances, outsourcing could be more important for high-skill sectors in
comparison to low-skill-intensive sectors.
In addition, the scope for outsourcing partly depends upon the degree to which
production of the final product can be fragmented into discrete stages, which
embody substantially different factor intensity ratios. This, in turn, will be
determined by technological conditions in the industry in question. Hence,
whether outsourcing is most appropriate in high or low-skill-intensive sectors is
an empirical question. In summary, although the incentive to outsource will be
                                                                
8 Given that we proxy outsourcing by import penetration of both finished and intermediate products,
we are implicitly capturing trends in both outsourcing and direct import substitution. to the extent that
the two mechanisms are positively correlated, our estimates should be interpreted as the ‘upper
bounds’ of the impact of outsourcing.OUTSOURCING AND INEQUALITY
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greater in low-skill intensive sectors where low-skilled workers comprise a
substantial portion of total production costs, the capacity and ability to
outsource may be greater in either high or low technology/skill sectors, and will
depend upon a variety of factors which may differ between countries. It follows
that outsourcing and its impact may be quite different across countries. This is
even more likely to be the case for our sample of four countries, given their
fundamentally different labour markets. One would expect adjustment to
increased competition from low-wage countries to occur mainly via changes in
the relative wages of the less skilled in the flexible labour markets of the USA and
UK, while relative employment is more likely to be affected in the more rigid
labour markets of Sweden and Italy.
Another important feature possibly related to outsourcing mechanisms is the
‘lumpiness’ of changes in the economic circumstances of the less-skilled. For
example, inequality increased dramatically in the early 1980s in both the USA and
UK, while Sweden experience a burst in inequality in the early 1990s. If
outsourcing is a significant cause of the rise in inequality, it may be the case that
outsourcing is occurring at an uneven pace. One explanation may be that
outsourcing is triggered by threshold levels related to  switching costs.  Orcutt
(1950) argues that the costs of switching from domestic to foreign suppliers may
cause the price elasticity of imports to be bigger for large price changes than for
small changes and a similar argument might be made for disproportionately large
increases in ‘outsourcing’. For example, when considering whether or not to
‘outsource’, producers have to take into account the costs incurred when
switching from in-house, or other domestic, supplies to foreign suppliers. When
switching to foreign suppliers, producers may have to modify production
techniques to be compatible with the newly-imported products and spend time
ensuring that the new supplier is both reliable and produces a product of the
required specifications and quality. Consequently, small changes in the price of
foreign goods will not be acted upon as the change in price differential will not
cover switching costs. In contrast, a large appreciation of the domestic currency
will result in a substantial differential between the costs of producing ‘in-house’
(or domestic) goods and imports – which may be at least sufficient to cover the
costs of switching. So, switching costs may cause a disproportionate increase in
‘outsourcing’ during  large  exchange rate  appreciations, which may partially
explain the ‘lumpiness’ of changes in the economic circumstances of the less-
skilled in some of the countries examined in this study. Similarly, high real
exchange rates and recessions may put considerable competitive pressures on
firms to reduce prices and outsourcing may be an effective way of reducing
costs.ANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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4. Methodology
In this section, we briefly outline the derivation of our basic empirical
specifications and then discuss our econometric estimates regarding the impact
of both trade with low-wage countries and changes in technology on the wage-
bill and employment shares of non-production workers in the various countries.
A key feature of our studies is that we use highly  disaggregated wage,
employment and production data. In common with the majority of previous
studies, we treat non-production workers as skilled and production workers as
less skilled.
9
Our empirical equations explain the share of the wage bill and/or employment
accounted for by the two categories of workers (skilled and unskilled) in terms of
the traditional factors entering the variable cost function of the firm; the level of
output, the amount of capital, technology, and factor prices. In our equations
these variables are supplemented by an import penetration term designed to
capture the incentives for the firm to outsource low-skill activities (the full
derivation of the equations is presented in  Anderton and  Brenton, 1999, and
Anderton, Brenton and Oscarsson, 2001). This import penetration term can be
interpreted as representing a reduced-form relationship between outsourcing and
a firm’s unit input requirement for skilled labour ( Feenstra and Hanson (1995,
1996)).
Specifically, following in the tradition of Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994)
and starting from a  translog representation of the cost function, we estimate
equations that typically take the following form
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9 However, in the study of Italy, which we discuss below, inequality is measured between white-
collar and blue-collar workers. Where blue-collar workers are manual workers and white-collar
workers are distinguished by the amount of their responsibilities. Thus, the Italian data are not open
to the same criticisms as the use of production and non-production workers which have been
criticised (see, Leamer, 1994) for the inclusion of certain manual workers - such as office cleaners -
as non-production, and hence skilled, workers.OUTSOURCING AND INEQUALITY
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SEit is the employment share of the high skilled (similarly derived as SWit).
WB
hs
it  is the wage bill of the high skilled (non-production workers).
WB
ls
it  is the wage bill of the lower skilled (production workers).
ls hs W W / = relative wage rates of high and low-skilled workers.
Kit is the capital stock.
Yit is real output.
TECHit proxy variable for technological change.
MSit  is a term measuring the importance of imports from low-wage
countries
10 relative to total domestic demand for the output of industry i.
Dt is a set of time dummies.
Uit is an error term.
d is the first difference.
Subscript represents industry i.
11
Note that in the wage share equation the relative wage term is dropped due to
potential endogeneity and the problem of the definitional relationship between the
dependent variable (the share of the wage bill) and relative wage rates. The time
dummies capture changes in demand for non-production relative to production
workers common across industries in each year. In the main, and in common
with most studies, we use R&D expenditure as a share of total output as our
proxy for technological change. However, in one exercise we also experiment
with patenting activity as a suitable proxy for technological change. One
advantage of using patents is that they are an output of the innovation process,
whereas R&D expenditure is simply an expenditure  input, which may never
come to fruition in terms of practical application in the manufacturing process.
                                                                
10 Low-wage countries are defined as non-OECD countries, with the OECD taken as those
members prior to 1994 (i.e. excluding recent members such as the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, South Korea and Mexico).
11 The bilateral import data are from the OECD on an SITC basis and converted to the ISIC REV2
industrial classification. Thus, we utilise trade, production, wage and employment data all
disaggregated to the 4-digit ISIC level, which probably reflects the highest level of sectoral detail
used in a comprehensive assessment of the impact of globalisation on labour market outcomes in
industrialised countries. Data at this level of detail are only available since the 1970s or later and so in
order to provide enough observations we pool the data across 4-digit ISIC sectors and apply a
‘panel estimation’ approach.ANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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5. Summary of Empirical Results
This section describes our results using panel estimates of the above
specification for the UK, USA, Sweden and Italy. An overview of our empirical
results is shown in Table 1. The first rows of the table show the estimated
parameter values for the standard variables which enter the cost function; output
(Y), Capital (K), relative wages (RW), where employment equations are reported,
and technology (R&D and Patents (PAT)). Subsequently, we report results for
the trade variables: import penetration from low-wage countries in value terms
(MPV), import penetration from low-wage countries in terms of quantities
(MPQ), and the variance of import prices (NSDIP), which will be discussed
below. We now briefly summarise the results from our studies country by
country.
5.1 United Kingdom
An initial study of the UK utilised data for eleven 4-digit ISIC sectors within the
textiles industry (usually defined as low-skill-intensive) and the non-electrical
machinery industry (high-skill-intensive). The data are annual covering the period
1970 to 1986. The key finding of this research is that, while  total import
penetration from all countries (measured in value terms) was not important,
imports specifically from low-wage countries were found to have a statistically
significant positive influence on the wage bill share of high skill workers within
the sectors analysed. In other words, increasing import penetration from low-
wage countries has reduced the wage bill share of low-skill workers and thereby
resulted in increased inequality. Table 1 (columns 1 and 2) provides a summary
of these results (see Anderton and Brenton, 1999, for further details).
12 Although
not reported here, similar results were found for the UK employment shares.
Further tests using dummy variables showed that the parameter with regard to
import penetration from low-wage countries was much smaller for the higher-skill
non-electrical machinery sectors relative to the low-skill-intensive textiles sectors,
suggesting that the higher-skill-intensive UK industry has been far less prone to
outsourcing.
                                                                
12 As the capital stock and R&D terms seemed to be collinear in the UK econometric analysis, we
show column (1) without the R&D term, and column (2) without the capital stock term.OUTSOURCING AND INEQUALITY
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Table 1: Estimated Wage Bill and Employment Share Equations
UK (wage bill share) USA (wage bill share) Sweden (employment share) Italy (employment share)
EQUATION (1) (2) (3)
LSA
(4)
LSB
(5)
HS
(6) (7) (8)
LSA
(9)
HS
C 0.38*10
-2
(0.94)
-0.13*10
-2
(0.29)
0.013
(2.27)
0.32*10
-3
(0.66)
0.23*10
-3
(0.81)
0.006
(3.24)
0.006
(3.35)
-0.007
(1.75)
-0.009
(1.29)
dlnYit -0.61
*10
-2
(1.01)
-0.82*10
-2
(1.33)
-0.014
(1.01)
-0.043
(3.31)
-0.025
(2.46)
-0.009
(1.36)
-0.006
(0.98)
0.015
(1.50)
-0.021
(2.33)
dlnKit 0.138
(1.60)
- -0.026
(0.59)
-0.66*10
-
3
(0.10)
0.029
(0.740
0.039
(2.42)
0.039
(2.45)
0.003
(0.30)
-0.018
(2.00)
dlnRWit - - - - - -0.076
(7.56)
-0.075
(7.57)
0.055
(2.04)
0.065
(2.41)
(R&D/Y)it-1 - 0.219
(1.62)
0.375
(0.43)
-0.014
(0.06)
0.052
(3.38)
0.053
(4.17)
0.055
(4.32)
0.039
(3.00)
-0.027
(0.45)
PAT/Y - - - - - 0.458
(4.08)
0.40
(3.50)
- -
dlnMPVit 0.016
(3.11)
0.019
(3.34)
0.29
(2.08)
0.58*10
-3
(2.21)
-0.58
*10
-4
(0.49)
- - 0.004
(0.125)
0.010
(2.01)
dlnMPQ - - - - - 0.005
(2.96)
0.003
(1.81)
- -
dlnMPQ*DHS - - - - - - 0.013
(3.05)
- -ANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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UK (wage bill share) USA (wage bill share) Sweden (employment share) Italy (employment share)
EQUATION (1) (2) (3)
LSA
(4)
LSB
(5)
HS
(6) (7) (8)
LSA
(9)
HS
NSDIP - - - - - - - 0.00
(0.25)
0.01
(2.50)
N 176 143 360 200 440 721 721 128 139
R
2 0.3728 0.3744 0.2368 0.5592 0.3583 0.3994 0.4073 0.31 0.31
SEE .01269 .01291 0.01088 0.00854 0.01325 0.0175 0.0174
Notes: (i) OLS estimation for annual data. The precise time period, as well as the number of 4-digit ISIC industries pooled across, differs between
countries (N equals the number of observations); (ii) ‘t’ statistics are in parentheses; (iii) The dependent variable is the wage bill or employment share of
high-skill workers, Y is a measure of domestic output (sales in the case of Italy), K is a measure of the capital stock, RW is the wage of the skilled relative
to the less-skilled, R&D is research and development expenditures, PAT is the number of industry patents, MPV is import penetration from low-wage
countries in value terms, MPQ is an index of the volume imports from low-wage countries relative to the volume of domestic output ( the former is
measured in tonnes, the latter is derived as the value of domestic output divided by the producer price index for each sector), lnMPQ*DHS is MPQ
multiplied by a dummy variable with a value of 1 for high-skill sectors and zero otherwise, NSDIP is the normalised standard deviation of import prices (unit
values) from 5 low-wage regions (Latin and Central America, Asia, Africa, NICS, and the rest of the world, with the latter corresponding mainly to central
and eastern European countries); (iv) in the case of Italy, Y enters lagged one period in the LSA regression and lagged two periods in the HS regression,
whilst MPV enters lagged one period in the HS regression; (v) LSA indicates low skill intensive sectors, LSB indicates low-skill intensive and capital
intensive sectors, HS indicates skilled intensive sectors; (vi) The (R&D/Y) term for Sweden is only statistically significant for the period 1990-93 (ie, the
Swedish R&D term is multiplied by a dummy variable with a value of 1 for 1990-93 and zero otherwise). Priors: Y is expected to be negatively signed as a
short-run decline in output tends to hurt the wages and employment the less-skilled relative to the skilled; K is expected to be positively signed as there
should be complementarities between capital and skilled-workers; RW should be negatively signed as an increase in the relative wage of skilled workers
should decrease the relative demand for such workers; R&D and PAT are expected to be positively signed when technological progress is skill-biased;
MPV and MPQ are expected to have positive signs if imports from low-wage countries have an adverse impact on the relative wages and employment of
the less-skilled. NSDIP is expected to be positively signed as the scope for outsourcing increases as the range of low-wage countries trading on
international markets increases. Full and detailed results for the UK are shown in Anderton and Brenton (1999); USA (Anderton and Brenton, 1998);
Sweden (Anderton, Brenton and Oscarsson, 2002).OUTSOURCING AND INEQUALITY
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We also investigated the impact of relative import prices – the price of UK
imports relative to the UK domestic price – again  disaggregated to the 4-digit
industry level and distinguishing between different import suppliers. Tests using
dummy variables revealed that these relative price terms were again only
statistically significant for low-wage country import suppliers for the low-skill-
intensive textiles industry, particularly during the early 1980s when import price
competition was further intensified by the high level of sterling. Moreover, the
relative price terms were included along with the import penetration variables,
hence their impact is in addition to the effects of any actual increase in import
penetration. Accordingly, the relative price terms might be interpreted as
capturing the ‘threat’ of increased competition from low-wage countries (and the
associated ‘threat’ of increased opportunities for reducing labour costs via
outsourcing).
In terms of the magnitude of its impact, these results suggest that outsourcing to
low-wage countries in the 1970s and early 1980s may have accounted for as
much as 40% of the increase in the wage bill share of skilled workers, and
approximately one third of their employment share, in the UK textiles industry.
Although we also found that technological change contributed significantly to the
observed within sector increase in inequality, our import penetration results
suggest a quantitatively much greater impact from trade than has been suggested
in other studies of the UK (for example, Haskel, 1996).
5.2 United States
Our analysis of the USA ( Anderton and Brenton, 1998b) uses a considerably
broader set of data for 40 manufacturing sectors using annual data for the period
1970-1993 and distinguishes between high and low-skill sectors given the
heterogeneous inequality outcomes for these different industries (see Table 2
below). The Table presents summary information for two groups of industries
that can be classed as low-skill-intensive (abbreviated as LSA and LSB) and one
group of high-skill-intensive sectors (HS). The LSA group contains sectors that
are traditionally thought of as low-skill intensive such as textiles and clothing. The
second group contains sectors where there is a high unskilled labour content
(relative to skilled labour) but production techniques are more capital intensive
than for the first group.
The upper part of Table 2 shows that the largest rise in US inequality occurred in
all three groups of sectors between 1978-1986 (a period of substantial dollar
appreciation), but that inequality continued to increase, albeit more gradually,
through the rest of the 1980s and early 1990s.
13 The bottom section of Table 2
                                                                
13 The higher wage bill share for non-production workers in the HS sectors relative to the other
sectors is consistent with our claim that the former sectors are relatively high-skill-intensive.ANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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shows that R&D expenditure is extremely small in the two low-skill sectors,
amounting to substantially less than one per cent of the value of output in both
sectors. Given that the R&D ratios are extremely small in these low-skill sectors
– indicating that these are low-technology-intensive industries – one obvious
question to ask is: ‘how can movements in R&D expenditure/technology explain
the change in the wage share of non-production workers in these low-skill-
intensive sectors when technology plays only a minor role in these industries?’.
On the other hand, the technology explanation seems to correspond with
movements in R&D expenditure in the high-skill sectors, particularly the large rise
in R&D between 1978-1986 during the period of the dollar appreciation in the
early 1980s corresponding with the large rise in inequality in these sectors (Table
2).
Table 2 also shows US imports from low-wage countries as a proportion of total
sectoral imports. Although the relationship between the import share of low-wage
countries in the low-skill sectors and the wage share of non-production workers
is unclear in the early 1970s, there is a large increase in the share of US imports
from low-wage countries during the period when inequality rose more rapidly and
the dollar appreciated. Conversely, imports from low-wage countries for the
high-skill sector group remained static between 1978 to 1986 – perhaps indicating
that the rise in R&D expenditure during that period may have acted as ‘defensive
innovation’ and succeeded in reducing import competition from low-wage
countries in this sector (however, the relatively high import share of low-wage
countries in this high-skill sector suggests that the degree of low-wage country
competition may be sufficient to be a plausible cause of defensive innovation).
The preliminary conclusions of the data-based analysis arising from Table 2 are
broadly supported by our econometric analysis. The econometric results for the
USA presented in the summary Table 1 show that increasing import penetration
from low-wage countries resulted in a significant increase in inequality in the two
low-skill-intensive groups of sectors. However, this is not the case in the  high-
skill-intensive intensive sectors where our econometric results show that
technological change –  proxied by R&D expenditure – explains the rise in
inequality. A similar story holds for the employment shares (see  Anderton and
Oscarsson, 2001, for more detailed results regarding employment).OUTSOURCING AND INEQUALITY
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Table 2: USA wage bill and employment share of non-production workers,
import share of low-wage countries ( LWCs) and R&D in low and
high-skill-intensive sectors
1
Wage bill share Employment share
Year LSA
2 LSB
2 HS
2 LSA
2 LSB
2 HS
2
1974 24.8 25.8 41.2 14.6 20.3 30.9
1978 25.1 26.3 42.2 14.9 20.3 32.3
1986 27.3 30.3 49.6 17.1 23.4 38.4
1993 28.6 31.7 51.1 17.5 23.7 37.6
Import share of LWCs
3 R&D/Output ratio
Year LSA
2 LSB
2 HS
2 LSA
2 LSB
2 HS
2
1974 37.7 26.1 34.9 0.45 0.48 4.24
1978 46.1 26.0 36.6 0.46 0.49 3.85
1986 58.0 30.2 35.8 0.57 0.86 5.79
1993 61.2 33.7 42.8 0.80 0.62 5.42
Notes: 
1All figures are in percentages. 
2LSA= low-skill sector group ‘A’ comprising ISIC sectors
3200, 3300 and 3400 (ie, Textiles, Apparel and Leather; Wood Products and Furniture; Paper,
Paper Products and Printing). LSB= low-skill sector group ‘B’ comprising ISIC sectors 3600,
3700 and 3810 (ie, Non-Metallic Mineral Products; Basic Metal Industries; Metal Products); HS=
High-skill sectors comprising ISIC sectors 3500, 3820, 3830, 3850 (Chemical Products; Non-
electrical Machinery; Electrical Machinery; Professional Goods). 
3 Sectoral imports from  LWCs
expressed as a percentage of total sectoral imports.
However, one might also argue that the dramatic rise in R&D expenditures in the
high-skill-intensive sectors in the USA between 1978-1986 may have been partly
trade-induced. For example, it may be the case that the substantial rise in the
dollar over this period, and the associated deterioration in the trade
competitiveness of US industry, may explain some of the rapid rise in R&D
expenditure intensities in the higher-tech sectors. First, less-competitive firms
within these sectors – most likely offering low-quality products, perhaps
associated with relatively lower R&D spending and a relatively high proportion of
low-skilled workers in their labour force – would have been squeezed out of
business (as the dollar appreciation made US imports much cheaper). These
possible  compositional effects imply that, after a considerable ‘shake-out’,
industry would subsequently consist of a higher proportion of high-tech firms
and the average R&D/output ratio would therefore rise (and be associated with a
higher proportion of high-skilled workers if the technology is skill-biased).
Moreover, the deterioration in competitiveness may have encouraged USANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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manufacturers to ‘innovate defensively’, that is, faced with strong competition
from low-cost imports, firms may have attempted to escape fierce import price
competition by upgrading the quality of their manufactures via ‘product
innovation’ which, in turn, required spending more on R&D.
14
5.3 Sweden
Sweden is an interesting and contrasting case since it is a much smaller and more
open economy than the US and the UK and has fundamentally different labour
market policies compared to these two countries (which are typically held up as
paragons of flexible labour markets). Nevertheless, all of these countries have
experienced a shift away from unskilled towards skilled workers within the
manufacturing sector. However, two important features characterise the Swedish
experience during our sample period 1970-1993. First, skill upgrading in Sweden
has been particularly evident in the  high-skill sectors such as Machinery and
equipment (ISIC 382), Electrical machinery, apparatus appliances and supplies
(ISIC 383) and Instruments and photo equipment (ISIC 385), while only a few
lower-skill sectors – such as, textiles, wearing apparel and leather (ISIC 32) –
display rises in labour market inequality. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which
reveals that the wage and employment shares for skilled (non-production)
workers increased by more within the high-skill industry group than in the low-
skill industry group, particularly at the end of the period (i.e. 1990-1993).
Source: Manufacturing, various issue, Statistics Sweden.
Note: High-skill industries are ISIC 342, 35, 382, 383 and 385.
                                                                
14 The experience of the UK during this period is very similar to that of the US. Between 1979-
1981, sterling temporarily appreciated by around thirty per cent and was associated with a rise in the
UK manufacturing R&D/output ratio from around 1.5 per cent to 2 per cent.
Figure 1: Wage and employment shares for non-production 
workers within Swedish manufacturing 1970-93, high-skill 
sectors (HS) and low-skill sectors (LS)
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Second, the non-production worker share of employment in Swedish
manufacturing increased from 27 to 35 percent between 1970 and 1993, with a
sharp increase from around 1990 onwards, while the share of the total
manufacturing wage-bill for non-production workers increased from 36 to 43
percent during the same period. The larger proportionate change in the
employment share compared to the wage-bill share of skilled workers suggests
that the increase in inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in Sweden
owes more to increasing disparities in employment opportunities than to greater
differentials in wages. This is confirmed by data which show that, in contrast to
the US and the UK, the relative wage of non-production to production workers
remained constant (with a premium of about 50 per cent) throughout the 1970s
and 1980s in Sweden and actually fell during the recession of the early 1990s. On
the other hand the ratio of manufacturing non-production to production workers
employed increased steadily from around 38 per cent in the mid 1970s to 45 per
cent at the end of the 1980s, followed by a large increase to 55 per cent in the
early 1990s recession.
Structural labour market rigidities in Sweden may explain why most of the
adjustment took place on the employment side, while relative wages remained
stable. For example, the Swedish labour market is characterised by ‘strong’ trade
unions (around 80 percent of employees were union members in 1991; see Edin
and Holmlund, 1995). As is well known, wage bargaining in Sweden was highly
centralised during a considerable part of our sample period. Such an institutional
framework tends to compress wage-differentials between skill groups, with the
result that a decrease in the relative demand for the less-skilled will be reflected in
a fall in relative employment rather than relative wages – which is consistent with
labour market outcomes in Sweden.
Accordingly, the econometric results shown for Sweden in Table 1 focus on the
employment share of skilled workers (although similar results hold for the wage
bill share equations which are not reported here – see  Anderton, Brenton and
Oscarsson, 2002, for full details of the Swedish results). One key point regarding
the econometric results for Sweden is that import penetration measured in value
terms was not statistically significant in any of our regressions. This is consistent
with previous studies of the impact of globalisation in Sweden. Meanwhile,
import penetration measured in volume terms, or the relative price of imports,
tended to have a positively signed statistically significant impact on the
employment share of skilled workers throughout our analysis of Sweden, but,
again, only for imports from low-wage countries.
By contrast, the relative price of imports from high-wage OECD countries was
not statistically significant when separately included, while import penetration in
volume terms by OECD countries was estimated to have a negative effect on the
share of skilled workers in employment and total remuneration. Hence, it appearsANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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that skilled workers in Sweden are in direct competition with other skilled
workers in OECD countries, whilst what threatens unskilled workers are imports
from emerging economies. The data for Sweden suggest a very low correlation (-
0.09) between the proportionate change in relative import prices for low-wage
countries and the proportionate change in import penetration measured in value
terms. On the other hand, the correlation between changes in relative import
prices and changes in import penetration measured in volume terms is much
higher (-0.54), thereby supporting our use of import volume measures in our
study of Sweden.
The econometric results also suggest a much stronger impact of technology on
Swedish inequality during the recession years of 1990-93.
15 Given that this
recession period was extremely unusual, in that after years of stable
unemployment the number of people without jobs increased dramatically, it
seems likely that this represented opportunities for a substantial restructuring of
production, probably associated with an increase in the intensity of competition
between firms as they attempted to sustain demand for their products in a
shrinking domestic market. An alternative interpretation might be that this was
simply a compositional effect within sectors whereby the severe recession and
increased competition resulted in the survival of the ‘better’ firms, which in this
case are high-tech/high R&D/high-skill-intensive firms, while the low-tech/low
R&D/low-skill-intensive firms simply went out of business. Under such a
scenario, the rise in R&D expenditure during 1990-1993 would also be
associated with an increase in the wage-bill and employment shares of the higher
skilled.
Another interesting result from the Swedish econometric analysis is that the
impact of trade with low-wage countries on Swedish inequality appears to have
been  larger for high-skill sectors compared to low-skill sectors.
16 From our
earlier discussion, we postulate that this may reflect that when outsourcing
requires foreign direct investment in low-wage countries – involving the
production of specific components/products possibly requiring supervision and
technical expertise from the investing company – then this may only be feasible
for high-skill/high-profit firms. Also, the scope for outsourcing depends upon the
degree to which production of the final product can be fragmented into discreet
stages with substantially different factor intensity ratios. This will be determined
by technological conditions in the industry, which may be more conducive to
outsourcing in high-tech sectors. According to our econometric results, the latter
may be the case in Sweden.
                                                                
15 The R&D term is only statistically significant for the 1990-93 period.
16 The parameter on the import penetration variable multiplied by a dummy variable for high-skill
sectors (dlnMPQ*DHS in Table 1) is quantitatively large and strongly significant.OUTSOURCING AND INEQUALITY
19
Finally, although we find that trade with low-wage countries has been an
important determinant of rising inequality in Swedish manufacturing sectors, our
results also demonstrate that technological change, as  proxied by patenting
activity and expenditures on R&D in the 1990s, also played a major role. Our
results suggest that between 1970-1993 outsourcing to low-wage countries
accounted for around 25 per cent of the average  sectoral increase in the wage
share of skilled workers in Sweden and for around 15 per cent of the increase in
the employment share. Technological change on the other hand was the dominant
factor accounting for well over half of the average increase in wage and
employment inequality in Sweden.
5.4 Italy
In Italy the share of blue-collar (low-skill) workers in total manufacturing
employment decreased by 6 percentage points between 1973 and 1983 and by a
further 6 percentage points between 1983 and 1995. The decline in the wage
share of blue-collar workers was less pronounced, particularly in the first period
up to 1983. All of the decrease in the wage share was concentrated in the period
after 1983 and up to 1995 (from 66% to 59%). The relatively large change in the
employment share compared to the change in the wage bill share shows that the
increase in inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in Italy, as in
Sweden, primarily reflects the adjustment of the quantity, rather than the price, of
unskilled workers.
This feature is also reflected in the trend in wages per blue-collar employee
relative to salaries per white-collar worker. Relative wages of blue-collar workers
increased by 14 percentage points between 1973 and 1984, but fell by 5 points in
the following period. These developments are consistent with previous evidence
suggesting that labour market regulations and institutions compressed the gap
between the relative returns to skilled and unskilled labour in Italy, at least until
the mid-1980s. During the 1970s, trade unions in Italy primarily bargained over
wages and managed to induce a strong compression of wage differentials.
Indeed, the collective contracts of the early 1970s granted equal increases in pay
to all workers. Furthermore, after 1975 high inflation rates in Italy were
accompanied by wage agreements stipulating that all wages should increase by an
equal absolute amount. These strict regulations were relaxed somewhat in the
1980s.
17
Our econometric analysis of Italy (Brenton and Pinna (2001)) shows firstly that
economic variables played little or no role in determining the relative demand for
                                                                
17 See Anderton and Barrell (1995) for further details of changes in institutional structures relating to
Italian wage formation. In particular, the ‘Scala Mobile’ imposed full backward indexation of all
Italian wages in line with inflation until the system was reformed in the mid-1980s.ANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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unskilled workers in the 1970s. This seems to confirm the dominant role played
by Italian labour market institutions in this period.
18 Subsequently, in the 1980s
and 1990s, following some labour market reforms, international competition
appears to have had a significant effect on the relative demand for unskilled
workers in Italy, but, as in the case of Sweden, this effect is significant only in
skilled-intensive sectors. According to the results of Brenton and Pinna (2001),
increasing import penetration in high-skill sectors in Italy in the 1980s and early
1990s accounted for around one third of the increase in employment inequality
between skilled and unskilled workers. Interestingly, technological change,
proxied by expenditures on research and development, was not a significant
determinant of the change in the employment skill-mix in Italian high-skilled
sectors.
In unskilled intensive sectors, such as textiles and clothing, where the impact of
imports from low-wage countries might be expected to be more pronounced, no
significant effect from imports was found. In contrast, technological change
seems to have played a significant role in skill upgrading in low-skill intensive
sectors. The result is consistent with previous studies that indicate that Italian
textile and clothing firms have remained internationally competitive by
increasingly switching to higher quality segments of the industry (see, for
example, Quintieri and Rosati, 1996).
A further feature of the Italian study is that a measure of the variance of trade
prices from different low-wage countries is introduced in order to capture the
idea that, over time, comparative advantages have become narrower ( Bhagwati
and  Dehejia, 1995) and that production has become more and more
internationally footloose and has undermined unskilled employment in countries
such as Italy. In other words, the incentive to outsource increases since instability
in the location of production and continual new entries into the international arena
generate uncertainty for firms regarding the nature of competitive conditions.
Such considerations are likely to be most pronounced regarding low-skill
intensive activities and may further encourage the outsourcing of this part of the
production process, whilst skill intensive elements, which are subject to less
volatility and uncertainty in international competition, are retained in the domestic
market. Interestingly, the measures of trade price variability for Italy are found to
be strongly linked to the phenomena of skill upgrading in the high-skilled sectors,
but not the low-skill industries. This suggests that uncertainty regarding trade as
well as the amount of trade itself might encourage firms to adjust and upgrade
production to more skilled labour intensive techniques and to outsource the less
skilled activities. This is an issue that warrants further research.
                                                                
18 For example, the real wage terms are wrongly signed for the Italian employment share results. This
is not surprising given that relative wages in Italy were compressed, and employment decisions
constrained, by labour market regulations and institutions.OUTSOURCING AND INEQUALITY
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6. Summary and Discussion of Policy Implications
This paper summarises the results of a selection of our empirical works which, in
contrast to the majority of other studies, find that trade has had a significant
impact on labour market inequality. This work uses the concept of outsourcing –
whereby the low-skill parts of the production chain are transferred to low-wage
countries – which is empirically  proxied by import penetration by those
countries. A key feature of the empirical work that distinguishes it from other
studies is the use of highly  disaggregated bilateral trade data which allow a
separation between imports from high- and low-wage countries at a highly
detailed industry level. Using these data, we have demonstrated that imports from
low-wage countries are associated with a decline in the relative demand, and a fall
in the wage-bill share, for less-skilled labour in the manufacturing sectors of
various countries. In line with other studies, we also find that technology has
played an important role in causing the increase in inequality in many countries.
However, there is also limited evidence that some of the rapid increase in
technology in recent decades has been trade induced through mechanisms such
as ‘defensive innovation’.
What does our finding that trade with low-wage countries has had an adverse
effect on the distribution of wages and employment within manufacturing sectors
imply for economic policy? An impulsive reaction might aim at stopping those
factors that are perceived as contributing to inequality and social exclusion by
restricting imports. However, given the array of domestic policies available in
modern industrial countries, it is clear that intervention that constrains trade will
be one of the least effective mechanisms. In essence, trade brings benefits as well
as difficulties and those benefits are expected to significantly exceed any costs
that arise. Thus, more effective policies will be those which tackle the problems
of inequality affecting unskilled workers without removing the gains from trade.
In other words, policy should seek to address as directly as possible the
problems of social exclusion without making matters worse elsewhere, as trade
barriers would do (Deardorff (1998)). To date there has not been an extensive
public discussion of how governments should respond to the widening wage and
employment inequality in Europe in the face of globalisation and technological
change, particularly regarding policies concerned with training and income
redistribution. This debate is perhaps now due.ANDERTON, BRENTON AND OSCARSSON
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